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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to examine the market structure at
the opening and its inﬂuence on subsequent trading. In particular, we
measure the market eﬃciency of a pre-opening call market (CM) fol-
lowed by a continuous double auction (CDA) focusing on the role of
information. Aimed by Weigelt (1991), Theissen (2000) and Hinterleit-
ner at al. (2015) we check whether the introduction of a call market
leads to underreaction among agents' bids, improving market eﬃciency.
Results evidence a positive correlation between pre-opening price and
subsequent prices traded and a lower price-dividend deviation in case of
high quality information.
1 Introduction
A growing body of literature addressed his study on the role of information
on market eﬃciency and price formation, evaluating the impact of the trading
institute.
Information is essential in ﬁnancial market, where individuals often act on
the basis of their own private information and a public knowledge about the
behaviour of the others (Banerjee and Bikhchandani et al., 1992). One the one
hand, Grossman and Stiglitz (1976) and Plott and Sunder (1982) studied the
dissemination of information ﬁnding that price converge toward the equilibrium
simply by observing market phenomena,on the other a widespread branch of
economists focused on the importance of market micro-structure in the price
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discovery mechanism, indeed Schinitzlein (1996) stated that the discussion of
the costs and beneﬁt of insider trading should take place within the context
of a speciﬁc market. The continuous double auction (CDA) and the single
call market (CM) have been the two most analyzed trading mechanisms in
literature. Smith (1982) found the price convergence process to be more rapid
in the continuous double action, conversely Morone and Nuzzo (2016) noticed
the persistence of informational mirages in both the trading systems, while
Hinterleitner et al (2015) combined the two form of markets, detecting that
a call-auction in the market pre-opening phase does have a positive spillover
eﬀect in term of spread, volatility and trading volume.
Our paper contributes to the existing literature by analyzing the eﬀect that the
introduction of a pre-opening call market before a continuous double action has
on the main ﬁnancial market stylized fact. This work is organized as follows:
Section 2 reviews the actual state of art, Section 3 describes the Experiment
design,Section 4 oﬀers a deeper analysis of the empirical outcomes and Section
4 concludes.
2 Literature Review
Information has always played a crucial role both in market and non-market
context. As outlined in Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani et al. (1992), herd
behaviour may result from private information not publicly shared, indeed
both of these papers showed that individuals, acting sequentially on the basis
of private information and public knowledge about the behaviour of others,
may end up choosing the socially undesirable option. In market conditions,
Grossman and Stiglitz (1976) showed that uniformed traders can become in-
formed through the price in such a way that private information is aggregated
correctly and eﬃciently. Earlier studies of Fama (1965) revealed a market is
eﬃcient whenever prices fully reveal the available information. Nevertheless,
it is equally true that prices converge properly in some, but not in every cases.
In fact, there is no reason to suppose that agents are aware about the true
value of the dividend of the traded asset, conversely it is more plausible that
they correct their prior belief by means of the signals they received from the
market (Rational Expectation Hypothesis). For this reason, the impact of the
informational distribution on market quality and their relation with the mar-
ket micro-structure has been continuously investigated in literature. Real-life
markets leaves little rooms to the proper identiﬁcation of traders behavior,
failing to check relevant characteristics, noised by external circumstances that
could not be under control, although the recent developments of experimental
procedures provide the advantage of reproducing the market environment in
a laboratory area, where powerful control for all signiﬁcant variables becomes
possible.
Guala and Mittone (2007) tackled this aspect arguing that many experiments
are not aimed at a well-speciﬁed real-world target but contribute to a library
of robust phenomena. Previously, Roth (1986,1988,1995) proposed a three-fold
classiﬁcation that moves from a pure theorist approach from a policy-maker
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support perspective. The supporting idea is that a laboratory setting allows to
check for robustness in variables changes, all other things being equals, high-
lighting a cause-eﬀects linkage. This is why the aim of this paper is to ﬁnd
evidences and diﬀerences due (or strictly related) to a change in the experi-
mental design, contributing to the exiting library of phenomena which can
be exploited by policy maker. Our starting point is the identiﬁcation of a the-
oretical framework which properly match with observed phenomenon, which is
why we exploit a Bayesian approach that is jointly based both on theoretical
and empirical evidence ( see next section for more details). A great number of
experimental studies involved continuous double auction market (CDA) as a
benchmark for testing the performance of other institutions (e.g. Ketcham et
al., 1984 and Horung et al., 2014). In this context, several paper focused on
the issue of aggregation of diﬀerent pieces of information owned by diﬀerent
traders and its dissemination. Plott and Sunder (1982) analyzed the informa-
tion distribution concluding that traders infer the state of the world by simply
observing market events, while Hey and Morone (2004) found that misinformed
agents acting on their private information mislead the market, although the
volatility of prices is lower when the quality and quantity of information in
the market are higher. Furthermore, Huber et al. (2008) observed that a posi-
tive relationship between information and higher proﬁts was detected only for
very high levels of information. Lux et al. (2016) analyzed diﬀerent level of
signal diﬀusion, ﬁnding that treatments in which information distribution is
bimodal (i.e. there are both informed and uninformed traders) bring about
higher informational eﬃciency than treatments where information is uniformly
distributed.
The convergence towards the theoretical prediction is doubtless a quality hint
and the experimental framework provides the opportunity to follow the price
path during the whole time frame. Pioneering studies about the approximate
convergence have been made by Smith (1962) and replicated by Sunder (1995)
and Morone (2008), evidencing a close connection between information relia-
bility and price ﬂuctuation around its fundamental value.
Price noises lead to indeterminacy in the equilibrium of the dynamics and
this directly inﬂuence the exchange returns. Mandelbrot and Fama (1963)
estabilished that changes in asset price returns do not have a normal distri-
bution, because of the inﬂuence of the outliers (i.e. both extreme favorable
and unfavorable trading) at the tail of the distrbutions. Fat tail distribution
(Bouchaud 2001) is an undesiderable outcome in ﬁnance because it both af-
fects the calculation of the expected return and reﬂects both inequalities and
bias in the information distribution, as widely demonstrate in literature (e.g.
Morone (2008)).
In this context, trading institutions have to lay down the basis for a trans-
parent and eﬃcient trading mechanism, solving the incentive, coordination
and logistical problems associated with price formation and exchange (Cason
and Friedman, 1996). The objective of a policy-maker is to determine which
market structure is ideal for trading. With regard to the market structure,
Theissen (2000) compared continous double auction, call market and dealer
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market. In her contribution the call market showed a signiﬁcant tendency to
underreact to the arrival of new information, maybe the continous auction and
the dealer market exhibited fewer deviation from the true value of asset. Mo-
rone and Nuzzo (2016) combined these aspects comparing the performance of
a call market and a continous double auction, restating the design of Camerer
and Weigelt (1991) where the presence of insider is expressed in terms of prob-
ability. They found that none of trading mechanism outperforms on the other
and the only appreciable advantage of call markets is a signiﬁcant reduction
of price volatility when no inside information has entered the market. Both
Madhavan (1992) and Shnitzlein (1996) found that a call auction structure
is best suited in terms of informational eﬃciency and liquidity. This is why
in recent times most western capital markets have introduced a call auction
as their opening mechanism. As widely demonstrated in Hinterleitner et al.
(2015) contribution, an opening call auction prior to continuous trading leads
to a smaller opening price deviation from fundamental value and lower spreads
than a continuous double auction alone.
Inspired by the current state of art, we aim to examine the relevant charac-
teristics of this hybrid form of market: Does a pre-opening call market (CM)
followed by a continuous double auction (CDA) ameliorate market eﬃciency?
Actually, ineﬃciencies are strictly linked to traders' beliefs and their failures
in updating correctly their prior knowledge. In a double auction mechanism,
where private signals instantaneously become public, they ﬁnd fertile ground
to ﬂourish. We hypothesize, according to earlier studies, that a pre-opening
call market could lessen the overreaction of agents and speed up price conver-
gence toward the real value of the fundamental.
In our laboratory framework we recall the model of herd behaviour of Bikhchan-
dani et al. (1993), indeed agents acted sequentially on the basis of their own
signal and the information spread out by other subjects' guesses. We introduce
diﬀerent level of information both in its distribution and in its accuracy, hence
a general state of uncertainty is perceived and report the results by comparing
the observed prices traded with diﬀerent market predictors.
3 Experimental Design
The experiment was conducted at the LEE laboratory at University of Jaume
I and programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). A total of 144 agents traded a
one-period life asset in 18 independent markets (three for each market institute
combined with the relative treatment), grouped in a within-group design of 8
traders per market.
At the beginning, each agent was provided with 200 units of experimental
money and 10 units of the asset. There was a common uncertainty about
the state of the world: at the end of each trading session the dividend might
assume a value of either 20 (Good State) and 10 (Bad State) with an equal
degree of probability given by the ﬂip of a coin in each trading session. During
the hybrid treatment each trading period was divided into two parts: a one-
minute pre-opening call market (CM) followed by a four-minute continuous
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double auction (CDA); conversely the other treatment was given by a stand-
alone four-minute CDA trained in each period. The trading activity in each
market layed down over 7 trading periods. There were two practice periods at
the beginning of the session.
Uncertainty about the dividend value is expressed both in terms of accuracy
and distribution, hence we have six types of treatment summarized in the table
1.
Earnings were expressed in Experimental Currency Unit (ECU) and they were
converted in Euro at the exchange rate of 1 ECU to 0.005. Agents were
informed about their proﬁts and the dividend value at the end of each period,
however they received the payment at the end of the session as a cumulative
sum of the proﬁts of the 7 real periods. They could sell no more than the asset
they owned and buy no more than they could aﬀord on the basis of the money
in their portfolio. In our experiment traders earned, on average, 10 euros per
hour. The trading institutions can be described as follows.
Precision Distribution # of Signals
Treatment 1 6/8 4/8 16(8)
Treatment 2 6/8 2/8 32(8)
Treatment 3 6/8 8/8 8 (8)
Treatment 4 5/8 4/8 16(8)
Treatment 5 5/8 2/8 32(8)
Treatment 6 5/8 8/8 8 (8)
Table 1: Summary table, In case of polarized information (treatment 1,2,4,5)
each informed agent receives more than 1 signal (2 in 1-4 and 4 in 2-5).
Pre-opening mechanism consisted in a call market (CM) where each trader
privately submitted his purchase or sale order. For a single unit of the asset,
the purchase order was the highest acceptable purchase price and the sale order
represented the lowest acceptable sale price. When the trading sub-period was
closed, all the orders previously submitted were collected and processed. In
particular, purchase orders were ordered from the highest to the lowest and
the demand function was derived. Sale orders were instead ordered from the
lowest to the highest and the supply function was derived. The intersection
point of the demand and supply function determined the clearing price at
which the orders were executed. Nevertheless, there was no guarantee for all
the submitted orders to be executed. In particular, only the purchase orders
at a price equal to or above the clearing value and only the sale orders at a
price equal to or below the equilibrium value were executed. Then, the clearing
system provided the market with a uniform price for each call.
The clearing price was the opening price of the subsequent continuous double
auction (CDA), where subjects , at any moment during the trading period,
were free to enter a bid (an oﬀer to buy one unit of the asset for a speciﬁc
amount of cash) or a request (an oﬀer to sell one unit of the asset for a speciﬁc
amount of cash). As a trade proposal was submitted, it appeared on the
book and became public. Traders could accept outstanding bids and asks.
As an existing bid or ask was accepted by another trader, a transaction was
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completed and the price at which the contract had been closed also appeared
on the book and become public information. Traders could buy/sell one unit
at a time and as often as they want in each trading period. For these reasons,
this trading institution is the richest one in terms of within period information
and trading opportunities. Otherwise, the stand-alone CDA treatment follows
the same rule of the one in the hybrid form.
3.1 Theoretical Framework and Hypothesis Set
By exploiting the Bayesian inference, we can compute the probability that the
true state of the world might occur (Alfarano, Camacho and Morone, 2010) .
Let us deﬁne :
• D={d1,d2} ={10,20} as the set of possible pay-oﬀs;
• I={10,20,0} as the informational set, where II = {10,20} ⊂ I and IN
= {0} ⊂ I deﬁne respectively the informative and uniformative signal
subsets;
• p as the probability that an informative private signal is correct (it might
be either 6
8
and 5
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• q=1-p as the probability that an informative private signal is incorrect;
• f as the probability to infer correctly on an uniformative signal;
• k1, k1,k3 and k4 as the number of inferences made on informative and
informative signal by assuming agents' rationality, with k1+k1+k3+k4
=N;
The basic idea is that those who do not receive a signal infer that the two
dividends are equally likely to occur (hence k3=k4), becoming neutral in un-
dermining the market probability of success.
Theoretically speaking, we have that :
Posterior ∝ Prior × Inference
and a binomial model best ﬁts our case, which is why we can assume a beta
distribution both for the prior and the inference model.
As stated by the principle of indiﬀerence 1, a prior which can not give any
type of evidence in favor of one speciﬁc result has to be modeled as a uniform
distribution where all the events are equally likely to occur. This is why, we
model our prior as:
Betaprior = Beta(θ;α, β) =
1
B(α, β)
θα−1(1− θ)β−1
1see Keynes, John Maynard (1921). "Chapter IV. The Principle of Indiﬀerence". A
Treatise on Probability. 4. Macmillan and Co. pp. 4164
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Where θ is the probability to observe the dividend and α and β are scale
parameters. It can be proved that, if α and β are equal to 1, we get a uniform
distribution. In fact:
E(θ|α = 1, β = 1) =
∫ 1
0
θf(θ|α, β)dθ =
∫ 1
0
1
B(α, β)
θθα−1(1− α)β−1dθ
with
B(α, β) =
∫ 1
0
θα−1(1− α)β−1dθ
By substituting α and β we have:
B(α, β) =
∫ 1
0
θα−1(1− α)β−1dθ =
∫ 1
0
θ0(1− α)0dθ = [θ]10 = 1
and
E(θ|α = 1, β = 1) =
∫ 1
0
θ(1− α)0dθ =
[
θ2
2
]1
0
=
1
2
Which means that both of the events are equally probable.
Moving onwards, we have that2:
BetaPosterior ∝ BetaPrior ×BetaInference = 1×BetaInference = BetaInference
hence prior does not inﬂuence the calculus of probability distribution.
By applying the same condition, we can state that uninformative signals do
not aﬀect the calculus of the joint posterior distribution. Now, these principle
might be applied to our data.
According to the type of treatment, p might be either 6
8
and 5
8
. Setting
q=1-p, we can model the following Bayesian rule (given 20 as the dividend
drawn at the end of the trading session) :
Pr(D = 20|I) = Pr(D = 20)× Pr(I|D = 20)
Pr(I)
A priori, Pr(D=20) is equal to 1
2
because events are equally likely to oc-
cur, Pr(I|D=20) is the probability of success given from the inference on
the observed signal and Pr(I) is the marginal distribution of the informa-
tional set according to the probability to observe dividends (Pr(I)=Pr(D=20)×
Pr(I|D=20)+Pr(D=10)× Pr(I|D=10)). In order to demonstrate the neutrality
of the uninformed trader on the calculus of the Bayesian Eﬃcient Price, we
state that they infer that the two events are equally probabily. Given k1, k1,k3
and k4 as the number of inference made on correct,uncorrect and neutral (both
k3 and k4) signals (with k1+k1+k3+k4 =N) we have:
Pr(D = 20|I) =
1
2
(
N
k1,k2,k3,k4
)× pk1qk2fk3(1− f)k4
1
2
(
N
k1,k2,k3,k4
)× pk1qk2fk3(1− f)k4 + 1
2
(
N
k1,k2,k3,k4
)× pk2qk3fk3(1− f)k4
2The result comes from the following simpliﬁcation : 1B(α,β)θ
α−1(1 − θ)β−1=1 if α=β=1
for each value of θ.
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Where k3 is equal to k4, since the probability to infer that the signal is 20 or
10 from an uninformative signal the same number of time. Hence, by applying
the exponential property, f is 1/2 and f+1-f =1, hence it vanishes in the
calculus of the probability of success:
Pr(D = 20|I) = p
k1qk2
pk1qk2 + pk2qk3
After some algebra we have:
Pr(D = 20)|I) = 1
1 + q
p
2k1−(k1+k2)
Hence we can state that the probability to observe the right dividend by in-
ferring on the data is not a function of unobserved signals.
We consider the Pre-Opening price in CMDA treatment as a public signal but
we can not say to what extend is reliable. This is why, as a null hypothesis of
our research, we treat it as a neutral signal that do not inﬂuence the probabil-
ity to trade close to the dividend. Therefore, we aim to reject this hypothesis
by evidencing that agents incorporate it in their choices.
To wit, if we consider that in the hybrid treatment subjects play the call mar-
ket at period n and the double auction at n + 1, we can model the following
Dynamic Bayesian rule:
Pn+1(D = d1|It) ∝ P (D = d1)× Pn+1(It|D = d1)
Given the likelihood of the DA treatment as P (It|D = d1), our hypothesis can
be explained as:
Pn+1(It|D = d1) 6= P (It|D = d1)
the study of the direction of possible inequality is worthy of attention. Now
we can calculate the Bayesian Eﬃcient Price as:
BEP = Pr(D = 20|I)× 20 + Pr(D = 10|I)× 10
That is, the probability to observe the dividend is not merely given by the
average quality of information present in the market, maybe it is a function
of the number of time each information type appear. Theoretically speaking,
given the highest number of correct signal disseminated, we can infer that
agent might be able to recognize the true dividend in each type of treatment.
The unique aspect that might slower the convergence is the diﬀerent levels of
uniformed traders.
Given the aforementioned consideration, we introduce the following market
predictions:
• Dividend (D)
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• Bayesian Eﬃcient Price (BEP ): BEP= Pr(D=d1|I)×d1+Pr(D=d2|I)×d2
• Eﬃcient Price (EP ): EP =∑i IiN , where i deﬁnes the ith inference made.3
It can be noticed that the Bayesian Eﬃcient Price converge toward the div-
idend, that is the best guess an agent can infer, while the standard eﬃcient
price come from the Expected Utility theory as a weighted average of the pos-
sible events.
In our experimental design there are no insiders, then there are no perfectly
informed agents and even if in some periods only few agents are informed, their
signal is expressed in probability terms.
Since there is no certainty about the true state of the world,a price convergence
towards the dividend is expected if and only if subjects correctly infer on pri-
vate signals revealed by others. In other words, a Bayesian approach suggests
that, once private signal are publicly shared there is a positive spillover and
other subjects can perceive the forthcoming dividend, inasmuch as correct in-
formation are higher in number [herd behaviour]. On the other hand it could
happen that the uninformed subjects are inﬂuenced by those who have the
wrong signal, bringing to an undesiderable outcome. In case of risk neutrality,
the subjects can individually weigh each of the signals received and therefore
the market price will be the average of the information collected (Eﬃcient
Price).
Given the aforementioned consideration, we aim to analyze the main ﬁnancial
stylized facts.
• Hypothesis 1 : Market eﬃciency diﬀers according to market structure.
We measure Market Eﬃciency on the basis of the three benchmarks listed
before. In particular:
 DDjp =
∑
t
|pjpt−Djp|
T
is the dividend deviation;
 DBEPjp =
∑
t
|pjpt−BEPjp|
T
is the bayesian eﬃcient price deviation;
 DEPjp =
∑
t
|pjpt−EPjp|
T
is the eﬃcient price deviation.
where j,p and t deﬁne respectively the market code, the trading period
and the subsequent number of exchange. Hence we have an aggregate
measure at a market level for each trading period.
Hinterlenter el alii (2015) discovered improvements in volatility and quan-
tity traded in the CMDA institute, then we also review these aspects.
Morevorer, Plott and Sunder (1982) found that when agents replicated
the same task over time, markets' behaviour converged toward the equi-
librium. Price convergence has a twofold meaning: it is a market quality
signal and at the same time it is a measure of the agents' ability to learn.
We check whether we might reject unit root hypothesis in each trading
period. Furthermore, we might evidence whether or not agents treat
3We consider the uninformed price (15) as the signal received by uninformed traded.
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pre-opening price as an uninformative signal or they include it in their
choice.
• Hypothesis 2 : The fat tails phenomenon of the ﬁnancial returns is
diﬀerent in CMDA.
The underlying idea is that whether there will be an improvement of
the informative eﬃciency it can be seen an alignment of subjects' ex-
pectations and therefore a reduction both of the volatility of the returns
and of the consequent probability to obtain extra proﬁts. This can be
measured considering both the kurtosis of the distribution- where if the
distribution has average in zero it would mean an increase of the ex-
change around the same price- and the analysis of the "heavyness of the
tails" to check excessive deviations in the exchanges (i.e.returns higher
than the value expected from a normal distribution).
4 Analysis and Results
Some examples of trading activity are reported in ﬁgure 1 (see the appendix
for the full representation). The x axis tracks time in seconds and the y axis
represents the price traded (in black), the pre-opening information (in green)
and the dividend (in dark red), while the quantity traded is simoultaneously
shown in the subplot.
ﬁgure 1: Time series examples.
As it can be seen , price rarely converge toward the dividend and in some
cases they move around the opening price.
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4.1 Market Eﬃciency and Price Convergence
We performs several analysis to test the key aspects of ﬁnancial markets.
In particular, we focus on market eﬃciency, calculated as discussed before.
Graphs show that, moving from one institute to the other, there are some sig-
niﬁcant improvements for higher level of information quality, as conﬁrmed by
the Mann Withney U-test conducted at market level.
a) Eﬃcient Price deviation (DEP )
per treatment.
b) Bayesian Eﬃcient Price deviation
(DBEP ) per treatment.
c) Dividend deviation per treatment. d) Quantity traded per treatment.
As outlined before, the best prediction that a subject can make is the dividend,
while it is expected that a subject completely risk-neutral plays close to the
average of the information received. As we note from the ﬁgures, the devia-
tions from the dividend are smaller in the CMDA institute when the quality
of the signal is greater (treatments 1,2,3), however we notice that the prices
are closer to the eﬃciency price in both institutions. Moreover, the quantity
traded is systematically lower when a pre-opening phase is introduced, as in
Hinterleinter (2016).
A positive linkage between pre-opening price and subsequent prices traded is
conﬁrmed by the correlation test between pre-opening and dividend gap from
dividend, that is, whenever pre-opening conclude with a misleading price, even
in the following trading session those distance persist.
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e) Correlation plot.
Correlation
Treatment 1 0.326 ∗∗∗
Treatment 2 0.365 ∗∗∗
Treatment 3 0.534 ∗∗∗
Treatment 4 0.586 ∗∗∗
Treatment 5 0.398 ∗∗∗
Treatment 6 0.485 ∗∗∗
f) Correlation test.
We formalize this relation by exploiting a random eﬀect tobit model(1)
because prices are both lower and upper bounded at 10 and 20 respectively)
and a random eﬀect model with robust standard errors(2):
P = α + β ×OP × Treatment (1)
DD = α + β ×DOP × Treatment (2)
Where j, t and p are respectively the market id, the exchange sequence number
and the correspondent period, P ans OP are J × (T × P ) matrices, α is
a 1 × 6 vector containing treatments intercepts, β is again a 1 × 6 vector
containing Opening price eﬀects per treatment. We employ data deviation
from the dividend with the same notation the random eﬀect model. DD and
DOP can be seen as the matrix diﬀerences between P and D and OP and D,
where D deﬁnes a J × (T × P ) matrix with dividend values. 4
4To avoid cumbersomeness, we pick the best guess a subject can make to model the
regression and we do not report random eﬀect model based on the distances between price
traded and opening price from others market benchmark because of their linear dependence.
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Dependent variable:
price traded price traded
censored panel
regression linear
(1) (2)
opening price 0.719∗∗∗ 0.422∗∗∗
(0.105) (0.076)
treatment 2: opening price 1.140∗∗∗ 0.194∗∗
(0.180) (0.092)
treatment 3: opening price 0.283∗∗∗ 0.181∗∗
(0.106) (0.092)
treatment 4: opening price −0.358∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗
(0.107) (0.089)
treatment 5: opening price −0.297∗∗∗ 0.080
(0.113) (0.116)
treatment 6: opening price −0.235 0.463∗∗∗
(1.735) (0.093)
σµ −0.508∗∗∗
(0.126)
σν 0.565
∗∗∗
(0.002)
constant yes yes
Observations 3,209 3,209
R2 0.203
Adjusted R2 0.200
Log Likelihood −6,424.386
Akaike Inf. Crit. 12,876.770
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 12,961.800
F Statistic 73.935∗∗∗ (df = 11; 3197)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 2: In the mixed eﬀect model, data are expressed in terms of deviation from the dividend.
Intuitively, in each trading session it is expected that each subject cor-
rectly react to the arrival of other private signal after some exchanges and the
presence of uniformed trader will only slow down the process, maybe it might
happen that people infer from incorrect signal, leading to a negative herding
behaviour and an high number of losses.
This is why we conduct Philipp-Perron test to account for price convergence,
even if this aspect have been rarely attained in literature. It is calculated as:
∆ddjt = (ρ− 1)ddjt + υjt
and it corrects both autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. As null hypothesis,
ρ is equal to one, i.e. a unit root process is observed and price variation only
depends on random error variations5.
PP test MW test MW test MW test
# of unit root ( %) # null hp acceptance (%) dividend gap quantity traded
DA CMDA DA CMDA p-value p-value
Treatment 1 1 0.857 0.809 0.856 0.027 0.04
Treatment 2 0.809 0.952 0.856 0.905 0.068 0.017
Treatment 3 0.952 0.856 0.952 0.856 0.003 0.206
Treatment 4 1 0.952 0.856 0.809 0.876 0.03
Treatment 5 0.952 1 0.809 1 0.68 0.01
Treatment 6 0.952 0.952 0.761 0.905 0.07 0.006
Table 3: Summary table. Phillip Perron test refers to the number of time unit root hypothesis can
be not rejected at 5 % signiﬁcance level , while the Mann Whitney U test columns report the number of
times agents play closer to the eﬃcient price with respect the dividend drawn. The last two MW test shows
p-values regarding the ﬁgures above, testing the alternative hypothesis that dividend gap distribution and
quantity traded are lower in the CMDA treatment.
5Test has been run on the time series predicted by means of auto.arima in R
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As predicted, a widespread unit root trend is observed and the considera-
tion made before are supported by the mann-withney wilcoxon runk sum test
that lead us to accept a downward location shift of CMDA dividend devia-
tion distribution with respect to DA one, even if price traded are closer to the
eﬃcient price in both the institute.
4.2 Fat Tails Returns
It is well known that the distribution of returns belongs to the class of `fat
tail' distributions (Bouchaud 2001). These distributions exhibit a hyperbolic
decline of probability mass.
The Hill estimator calculates the tail index, giving us information about the
`fatness' of the tails of the distributions. It considers the log average descending
rate of tail values and can be computed as follow:
m∑m
i (log xn−1+1 − log xn−m)
Wherem is the number of observation in the tail and
∑m
i (log xn−1+1−logn−m)/m
can be seen as the average descending rate from the threshold value. Hence, it
can be stated that the ﬂatter is the slope (i.e. the lower will be the diﬀerences
among the subsequent value from the threshold) the fatter will be the tail.
Empirical studies show that the Hill estimators usually lie in the range [2.5, 5].
Examples include Koedijk et al. (1990), Jansen and de Vries (1991), Loretan
and Phillips (1994), Longin (1996), Lux (2002) and Lux and Ausloos (2002).
Excess of Kurtosis is another relevants issue that highlights the stationary
pattern of the returns distribution (see Morone, 2008), implying that the ex-
perimental ﬁnancial market exhibits more probability mass in the tails and in
the centre compared with a normal distribution.
Kurtosis Skewness Hill's Index 95 %
Treatment CMDA DA CMDA DA CMDA DA
1 10.487 (1.117) 13.090 (2.142) -0.537 (0.517) -1.483 (0.477) 1.881 (0.376) 2.202 (0.382)
2 18.783 (4.302) 14.032 (2.165) -1.817 (0.802) -0.496 (0.723) 2.081 (0.472) 1.795 (0.286)
3 8.835 (1.101) 10.667 (1.944) -0.598 (0.415) -1.119 (0.473) 2.659 (0.571) 3.225 (0.654)
4 13.827 (2.429) 6.701 (0.898) -1.152 (0.580) -0.705 (0.231) 2.033 (0.423) 4.049 (1.421)
5 7.084 (1.033) 8.561 (1.445) -0.999 (0.280) -0.891 (0.389) 3.807 (0.712) 3.013 (0.534)
6 19.952 (5.635) 17.617 (3.227) -1.847 (0.623) -1.847 (0.623) 3.125 (0.631) 2.723 (0.461)
Table 4: Simulated distribution of Kurtosis, Skewness and Hill's index at 5 %
level.
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ﬁgure 2 CMDA (left) and DA (right) returns distribution.
ﬁgure 3 Kolmogorov Smirnov test results.
In order to strenghten our result, we make some inference by simulating
the distribution of Kurtosis, Skewness and Hill index calculated at 5% level
(right tail). Davidson (2009) suggests a computer intensive method, such as
bootstrap or other simulation or resampling method and the inclusion of a
statistical test to draw conclusion from index that do not have a variance
6. We iterate the bootstrap 1000 times with the following results (Table 4).
Generally speaking, our result are in line with previous one, where distributions
are leptokurtic and not fat-tailed ( on average, tails lies on the [2.5,5] interval
). We run a Kolmogorov-test ﬁnding that all the diﬀerences among CMDA
(blue) and DA (red) are statistical signiﬁcant, even if there is no mechanism
that systematically outperforms each other.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have discussed the introduction of a pre-opening call market
in a countinous double auction trading system. The underlying idea was that
this phase might help agents to ameliorate their prior belief at the opening
6In his paper he proposes that method to inference on the Gini index. See R. Davidson,
Reliable inference for the Gini Index (2009) for more details.
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of the trading session, leading to a reduction of the most analyized market
ineﬃciencies. The results can be summarized as follow:
• The introduction of a pre-opening phase in itself is not suﬃcient to im-
prove informational eﬃciency at the opening of the continuous double
auction, even if there is a positive correlation between pre-opening and
trading price which suggest that such type of information is not neutral
and traders include it in their predictions;
• No convergence is observed in both the institutes;
• Moreover, this hybrid form of market does not reduce the probability to
have extra proﬁt, even if it mantains all the aspects of the standalone
double auction of our analysis (kurtosis and no-heavy tail).
To conclude, we consider the introduction of a pre-opening phase as a note-
worthy tool to inject additional information into the market, maybe it has to
be evaluated according the quality degree of the information. Indeed we found
that such mechanism in itself it is not suﬃcient to get model convergence and
to lower price eﬃciencies during trading sessions, conversely it is able to reduce
ﬂuctuation and quantity traded and it seems to be more taken into account
in accordance with a more precise signal. Further studies might be addressed
toward this direction.
Appendix
Here we display the results of the Wilcoxon Mann Withney test. In table 5
we report the pairwise diﬀerences between the Bayesian Eﬃcient Market pre-
diction (DBEF ), the true value of the dividend (DD) and the Eﬃcient Price
(DEF ) deviation at a market level, while in ﬁgure 4 we fully represent market
time series. We conduct Mann-Withney test on the basis of the consideration
made by observing the boxplot,that is, we test whether Eﬃcient price devia-
tion are eﬀectively smaller than Bayesian Eﬃcient Price and Dividend Price
deviation. Moreover, we compare Dividend and BEF deviation even if they
are very close to each other.
DEF/DD DEF/BDEF DD/BDEF
1 0.015 0.006 0.000
2 0.227 0.141 0.000
3 0.000 0.000 0.000
4 0.024 0.000 0.000
5 0.000 0.000 0.000
6 0.480 0.006 0.000
Table 5: CMDA within comparison. Alternative="less"
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DEF/DD DEF/BDEF DD/BDEF
1 0.000 0.000 0.283
2 0.013 0.008 0.325
3 0.002 0.001 0.354
4 0.578 0.000 0.002
5 0.105 0.000 0.006
6 0.205 0.014 0.020
Table 6: DA within comparison. Alternative="less"
DEF BDEF DD
1 0.956 0.048 0.048
2 0.599 0.118 0.118
3 0.003 0.001 0.001
4 0.100 0.699 0.834
5 0.001 0.725 0.894
6 0.1303 0.039 0.066
Table 7: Between comparison. Alternative="less",that is, CMDA deviations
are lower than DA ones.
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ﬁgure 4 full time series representation
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